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REPORTS of fraudulent solicitations involving charitable insti-
tutions permeate the news.' Spurred on by these reports, as
well as reports of self-dealing, inefficiency, and excess in charita-
ble solicitations, numerous states have acted to regulate charitable
solicitations.' Congress has also considered regulating charitable
solicitations in order to control these irregularities.3 Because pros-
ecution for fraudulent solicitation is difficult under existing laws,4
* Professor of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; S.B.,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1977); Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania (1984).
I. See, e.g., Evans, Alexandria Firm Accused of Fraud, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 1989,
at A13, col. I (Virginia direct-mail firm accused by Missouri Attorney General of fraud
and deception in fundraising letters it sent on behalf of its client charities); Garcia, State
Conducting Probe of Two Charities, L.A. Times, Dec. 28, 1988, part 2, at 3, col. 4 (Cali-
fornia Attorney General investigates national direct-mail campaign offering sweepstakes
award to potential donors).
2. State Laws Regulating Charitable Solicitations, GIVING USA UPDATE, Jan.-Feb.
1988, at 4, 4-10 (table listing state law restrictions on charitable solicitations as of Dec. 31,
1987). See generally Keeping Up With the States in PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY (a standing
column discussing the effects of changing state laws which regulate charitable contribu-
tions); e.g., Stevenson, Keeping Up With the States, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Feb. 1986,
at 25, 25 (discussing the Pennsylvania legislature's proposed law that would limit solicita-
tions to institutions in which solicitation and fundraising expenses do not exceed 35% of
actual contributions received).
3. See, e.g., H.R. 2188, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H2638 (daily ed.
Apr. 28, 1987)(proposing amendments to Internal Revenue Code which would require cer-
tain charities which solicit contributions from the public to use at least 50% of gross re-
ceipts for charitable purposes); H.R. 2130, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. H2132
(daily ed. Apr. 22, 1987)(requiring disclosure of certain information in connection with the
solicitation of charitable contributions by mail). But see Two Curious Case Histories of
Proposed Legislation in Congress to Regulate Charities and Mail Fund Raising, PHILAN-
THROPY MONTHLY, May 1987, at 20 (suggesting that the motive for introducing this legis-
lation was political rather than concern about fraud in charitable solicitations).
4. The problem with prosecution under traditional fraud theories is that charities can
use creative accounting to hide many fraudulent acts. Even if the accounting numbers are
accurate other problems persist. For instance, the lack of an upper limit defining when the
proportion of expenses to charitable contributions rises to the level of fraud creates uncer-
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legislators have recently experimented with a new approach which
involves restricting the allowable fundraising percentage.'
This area of the law has also attracted the attention of the
courts. In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment, the Supreme Court held that charitable solicitations are
within the protection of the first amendment. This protection
forces a state to demonstrate that the statute "serves a sufficiently
strong, subordinating interest that the [state] is entitled to pro-
tect ' 7 and that the statute is a "narrowly drawn. regulation
designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering
with First Amendment freedoms."" Applying this test, the Su-
preme Court has consistently found that restrictions on fundrais-
tain results. Compounding the difficulty of fraud prosecution are the evidentiary problems
of prosecuting telephone solicitors who often use false names and the limited manpower
allocated by the states to this problem. Conversations on Fund Raising Law Reform, PHI-
LANTHROPY MONTHLY, Feb. 1986, at 29, 32-34 (comments of Mr. Kevin Suffern, Director
of the Division of Public Charities of Massachusetts, Assistant Attorney General of Massa-
chusetts, and co-chairman of the National Model Law Project).
5. A charity's fundraising percentage equals the expenses of solicitation divided by
the total funds raised by solicitation. Illinois used this definition in the following legislation:
Where less than 75% of the gross receipts, excluding any bequests or gifts by
will or other testamentary device, of such charitable organization . . . are used
for charitable purposes.. . . [The Attorney General] may bring . . . an action
in the name, and on behalf of the people of the State of Illinois against such
charitable organization and any other person who has participated . . . in such
solication ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 5109(c) (1987). The Illinois statute defines "gross receipts"
as "receipts after the legitimate and reasonable cost of any merchandise for resale or the
legitimate and reasonable cost of services required with the fund raising event or program
are deducted." Id.
6. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
Accord Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 108 S. Ct. 2667, 2673 (1988); Maryland v.
Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959-60 (1984). See also New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)(holding that a newspaper advertisement which solicited
funds was protected by the first amendment).
In Schaumburg, the Court stated:
[C]haritable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of
speech interests - communication of information, the dissemination and propa-
gation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes - that are within the
protection of the First Amendment. Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly
subject to reasonable regulation but the latter must be undertaken with due re-
gard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with inform-
ative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that
without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely
cease.
444 U.S. at 632.
7. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636. Accord Munson, 467 U.S. at 961.
8. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637. Accord Munson, 467 U.S. at 961.
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ing percentages purporting to attack fraud in charitable solicita-
tions are unconstitutionally broad9 because "there is no nexus
between the percentage of funds retained by the fundraiser and
the likelihood that the solicitation is fraudulent."10
Chief Justice Rehnquist offers an opposing view. He uses a
commercial speech analysis which allows restrictions on the fund-
raising percentages of professional fundraisers as long as these re-
strictions are narrowly tailored.11 These limitations are useful, he
9. "Our prior cases teach that the solicitation of charitable contributions is pro-
tected speech, and that using percentages to decide the legality of the fundraiser's fee is not o
narrowly tailored to the State's interest of preventing fraud." Riley, 108 S. Ct. at 2673.,
Accord Munson, 467 U.S. at 966-68; Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636-37.
In Schaumburg, the Court distinguished the case before it from National Found. v.
City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970). In
the latter case, the federal court of appeals upheld an ordinance which limited the cost of
charitable solicitations within the city to 20% of the amount collected. The Schaumburg
Court noted that Fort Worth's provision allowed an administrator to waive the 20% re-
quirement if the solicitor could show the expense was reasonable. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at
627-28. Legislators have since tried unsuccessfully to adapt their percentage-based limita-
tions to meet the National Foundation exception. After Riley, however, any reliance on
National Foundation may be ill-founded. In Riley, the Supreme Court invalidated a stat-
ute which allowed solicitors to overcome the percentage requirement by showing the rea-
sonableness of the solicitation costs. The statute was held cQnstitutionally invalid because it
placed the burden on the speaker to-justify his speech rather than on the state to justify the
limitation. Riley, 108 S. Ct. at 267475.
10. Riley, 108 S. Ct. at 2675. The majority of the Court feels that use of.percentage
based restrictions is capricious. In Riley, the Court stated:'
[T]he use of a.percentage based test was not narrowly tailored to achieve [the]
goal [of prevention of fraud]. In fact, we found that if the statute actually pre-
vented fraud in some cases it would be "little more than fortuitous." An
"equally likely" result would be that the law would "restrict First Amendment
activity that results in high costs but is itself a part of the charity's goal or that
is simply attributable to the fact that the charity's cause proves unpopular."
Riley, 108 S. Ct. at 2673 (quoting Munson, 467 U.S. at 966-67).
11. In his dissent to Munson (joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell
and O'Connor), Justice Rehnquist argued that a percentage restriction on payments to a
professional fundraising firm "is merely an economic regulation controlling the fees the
firm is permitted to charge. A similar regulation governing, for example, the fees charged
by an employment agency would be judged and approved under the minimum rationality
standard traditionally applied to economic regulations." Munson, 467 U.S. at 979 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Riley (joined by Justice O'Connor), Justice Rehn-
quist argued that "the Court obdurately refuses to allow the various States which have
legislated in this area to distinguish between the sort of incidental fundraising involved in
Lovell, Schneider, and Martin on the one hand, and the entirely commercial activities of
people whose job is, simply put, figuring out how to raise money for charities." Riley, 108
S. Ct. at 2682 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Schaumburg, Justice Rehnquist
stated:
Today's opinion strongly, and I believe correctly, implies that the result here
would be otherwise if [the] primary objective [of Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment] were to provide "information about the characteristics and costs of goods
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argues, because they prevent diversion of charitable solicitations
for private financial gain.12 Furthermore, percentage limitations
help fulfill the expectations of the average contributor who expects
the bulk of his contribution to go directly to the charitable pur-
pose he selected. Percentage limitations also prevent charities
from being overcharged by professional fundraisers.1" "The con-
cern is not that someone may abscond to South America with the
funds collected. Rather, a high fundraising fee itself betrays the
expectations of the donor who thinks that his money will be used
to benefit the charitable purpose in the name of which the money
was solicited."' 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist has found the percentage
limitation statutes to be sufficiently narrowly tailored because he
sees high solicitation expenses themselves as an evil which the
state can regulate.
Accomodation of first amendment values requires statutes
that are narrowly tailored. This standard forces legislatures to
supply a clear and precise statement of the state's interest in regu-
lation. The difference between the majority's rationale in Schaum-
burg and the rationale offered by Chief Justice Rehnquist is that
Chief Justice Rehnquist uses a commercial speech standard. The
and services," [Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632 (majority opinion)] rather than to
"advocate positions on matters of public concern." [Id. at 635]. Four years ago,
however, the Court relied upon the supposed bankruptcy of this very distinction
in overturning a prohibition on advertising by pharmacists. . . . This and other
considerations led the Court in that case to conclude that "no line between pub-
licly 'interesting' or 'important' commercial advertising and the opposite kind
could ever be drawn."
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 642 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(citations omitted)(quoting Vir-
ginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
12. Percentage limitations "insure that funds solicited from the public for a charita-
ble purpose will not be excessively diverted to private pecuniary gain. In the process, they
encourage the public to give by allowing the public to give with confidence that money
designed for a charity will be spent on charitable purposes." Munson, 467 U.S. at 980
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13.
There is an element of "fraud" in soliciting money "for" a charity when in real-
ity that charity will see only a small fraction of the funds collected. But even if a
fundraiser were to fully disclose to every donor that half of the money collected
would be used for "expenses," so that there would be no question of "fraud" in
the common-law sense of the word, the State's interest is not at an end. The
Statute . . . is also directed against the incurring of excessive costs in charitable
solicitation even where the costs are fully disclosed to both potential donors and
the charity. Such a law protects the charities themselves from being overcharged
by unscrupulous professional fundraisers.
Munson, 467 U.S. at 980 (footnote omitted)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14. Munson, 467 U.S. at 980 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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current majority sees no necessary connection between percentage
limitations and fraud. The validity of that assertion requires a ba-
sic understanding of what the contributor was trying to accom-
plish in addition to an assessment of the charity's objectives.
The following analysis is intended to assist legislators in iden-
tifying legitimate state interests more precisely and in designing
statutes which will survive constitutional scrutiny. Sections I and
II consider the diversity of donor and donee objectives as well as
precisely when these donors and donees have cause to feel de-
frauded. Section III considers regulatory rationales based on soci-
ety's broader interests. Section IV argues, consistent with the ma-
jority view in Schaumburg, that fund raising limitations generally
fail to accomplish any of these legitimate state interests. Section
IV concludes by suggesting alternative regulatory instruments
which are better tailored to meeting these goals.
I. THE DONOR PERSPECTIVE
The Supreme Court has ruled that statutes mandating a low
fundraising percentage do little to protect the donor's interests.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's view notwithstanding, the Court's posi-
tion is correct for several reasons. For instance, donors may sup-
port charitable goals which can only be accomplished with a high
fundraising percentage. 15 In addition, there is nothing in the per-
centage limitation that prevents a dishonest organization from
misdirecting funds.16
There are two deeper reasons why fundraising percentage is
not a valid indicator of fraud against donors. First, donor interests
are often broader than charitable output alone. Second, the aver-
age fundraising share is itself a misleading statistic because it
does not inform the donor as to the value of incremental
donations. 17
15. These goals can be accomplished by "organizations whose primary purpose is not
to provide money or services for the poor ... but to gather and disseminate information
about and advocate positions on matters of public concern." Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 635.
Accord Riley, 108 S. Ct. at 2675; Munson, 467 U.S. at 963-64.
16. Munson, 467 U.S. at 967.
17. The fundraising percentage at each level of donation is different. As the total
donations increase, the percentage of funds spent on expenses will decrease because certain
fixed costs will have been paid completely by earlier donations. In this way, although the
average fundraising percentage is high (i.e., more money for expenses), the incremental
fundraising percentage after fixed costs have been paid may be low (i.e., more money to
the charity). The later contributor may feel that he is getting a higher value for his charity
1988-89]
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A. Donor Interests
Donors support many different charitable activities. In sup-
porting charities donors often engage in the legitimate purchase of
goods and services. 18 Charities frequently offer an explicit good or
service along with the opportunity to make donations. Apparently,
many donors find that a dinner, special event, or dedication cere-
mony complements their desire to make a donation.19 Such events
are a cost of fundraising; they provide incentives which may in-
crease the volume of donations. The donor, in these circumstances,
is not defrauded by a low fundraising percentage because she re-
ceives an explicit private good in addition to the incremental char-
itable output.20
A donor may also have goals other than charitable output
maximization. For example, purchasers of Girl Scout cookies are
frequently more concerned with the happiness of the soliciting
child than the incremental monetary resources provided to the or-
ganization. These donors probably would not feel cheated if the
fundraising percentage were low. Contributors to United Way
might be lumped into this same class as well, because "[t]he ex-
pected benefits . . . are in the form of goodwill in response to so-
cial pressure, rather than estimation of personal gain from services
provided by United Way."' State laws which restrict fundraising
dollar because the percentage of his donation which goes to expenses is low. This may
encourage donors to contribute to a charity after initial fundraising expenses are paid.
18. This was recognized in Riley, 108 S. Ct. at 2679, in which the court stated,
"[d]onors are undoubtedly aware that solicitations incur costs, to which part of their dona-
tion might apply."
19. See generally Nielsen, Piggybacking Strategies for Nonprofits: A Shared Costs
Approach, 7 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 201, 201 (1986)(presenting "case data and a conceptual
foundation for nonprofit piggybacking whereby a nonprofit organization subsidizes its defi-
cit producing primary mission by diversifying into related surplus-producing ventures");
Posnett & Sandier, 14 PUB. FIN. Q. 209, 220 (1986)(arguing that "joint supply, in which a
private good is supplied in circumstances in which surplus revenues are directed to finance
a public output, is one possible explanation of why large fund-raising charities are
successful").
20. Indeed, donors must reduce their tax deduction for charitable contributions by
the value of anything received in exchange for the contribution. M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION, A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASEs AND CONCEPTS 147
(1985). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(c)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1982).
21. Keating, Pitts & Appel, United Way Contributions: Coercion, Charity or Eco-
nomic Self-Interest?, 47 S. ECON. J. 816, 816 (1981)(providing statistical evidence in sup-
port of this hypothesis). See also Long, Social Pressure and Contributions to Health Char-
ities, 28 PUB. CHOICE 55, 66 (1976)(statistical support for "the hypothesis that social
pressure affects the level of charitable contributions" but "that the form of the pressure is
an important determinant of the size of health contributions"); Steinberg, Nonprofit Orga-
[Vol. 39:775
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percentage needlessly frustrate these classes of donors, since the
satisfaction they derive from making a donation bears little rela-
tion to the charitable output of the donee.
B. The Fundraising Percentage
For those donors who are concerned only with charitable out-
put, a charity with a high fundraising percentage might appear to
be a bad buy. Donors who are not informed of the percentage
would appear to be defrauded. Donors who are informed but
choose to donate anyway would appear to need protection from
their own follies.
Intuition indicates that a high fundraising percentage trans-
lates into a lower amount of charitable output per donated dollar.
This intuition is wrong.22 Incremental resources provided for char-
itable service are unrelated to the average fundraising share.2 3 A
donor should not feel personally defrauded by a high average fun-
draising percentage if the incremental effect of his donation on
charitable output remains high. 4
A simple example illustrates this point. Suppose someone
made a donation to a charity which always spends $10,000 per
year on solicitation and devotes all other resources to the provision
of services. The charity receives $1,000 per year in royalty in-
come. Near the end of the year, $9,000 in donations have been
raised, so that the average fundraising share exceeds 100% and
the charity is unable to provide any services. Despite the excessive
fundraising percentage in this example, one hundred percent of
the incremental donations made at this point would be devoted to
providing services, and the charity would be a very good buy for
the donor.
This situation will arise in a nonprofit which maintains a so-
licitation budget independent of its fundraising receipts. In such
charities, donations are first used to offset the expense of fundrais-
ing. This point is important because a nonprofit may respond to
incremental donations either by decreasing the solicitation budget
nizations and the Market, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 118, 121 (W. Powell ed. 1987)(ar-
guing that "Donors often make implicit trades, obtaining direct benefits . ., indirect ben-
efits . . ., and Kantian benefits .... ").
22. See Steinberg, Should Donors Care about Fundraising?, in THE ECONOMICS OF
NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 347, 347 (S. Rose-Acker-
man ed. 1986)[hereinafter Steinberg, Donors].
23. Id. at 355-56.
24. Id. at 361.
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or by increasing it.2 5 The incremental effects on charitable output
of a donation thus depend on the objectives of the donee.
A "service maximizer" is a donee who sets the solicitation
budget so as to maximize the expected net returns from fundrais-
ing. This is achieved when a one-dollar increase in the solicitation
budget is expected to yield exactly one dollar of additional dona-
tions. If the anticipated incremental returns exceed one dollar, the
firm could increase its net receipts by increasing the solicitation
budget until diminishing returns set in and further net gains be-
come impossible.26
A "budget maximizer" cares only about the total returns
from fundraising. Such a firm would devote an additional dollar to
fundraising so long as any increase in donations, even one penny,
was expected. Every penny of donations would increase the size of
the overall budget, and budget maximizers are indifferent to
whether these resources are devoted to service or solicitation ef-
forts. Thus, the incremental net returns are negative at the solici-
tation budget level selected. Fundraising by budget maximizers is
excessive in the sense that a decrease in the solicitation budget
could actually increase service expenditures.27
Despite this excess, budget maximizers are no different than
service maximizers from the donor's perspective, because either
goal would lead the firm to select a solicitation budget which is
independent of actual incremental donations. If the firm receives
an extra dollar of donations, this would not affect the prospective
returns on additional spending for solicitation. Thus, neither
budget nor service maximizers are likely to adjust their fundrais-
ing budget in response to incremental donations. As in the exam-
ple, once the solicitation expenses have been offset, the "cost" of a
dollar's incremental service provision is exactly one dollar, since
the incremental dollars received thereafter go entirely to service
28provision.
25. The solicitation budget would be cut if increased donations convinced the board
that a less ambitious effort could accommodate their needs. Alternatively, the board might
view incremental donations as a sign that they had underestimated their fundraising poten-
tial; in response they might increase solicitation efforts.
26. It is reasonable to assume that the incremental returns per dollar of fundraising
expenditure eventually diminish. When they become less than one dollar, further expendi-
tures yield negative returns.
27. Reducing the solicitation budget would eliminate some of the negative incremen-
tal net returns, thereby releasing funds from fundraising to provide charitable output
instead.
28. Technically, this is true only for "small" incremental donations in the sense that
[Vol. 39:775
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The situation is more complicated if the nonprofit decides to
adjust its solicitation budget in direct response to incremental do-
nations. When this occurs, the change in the budget induces a
change in donations which induces a further change in the budget,
ad infinitum. Thus, the impact of an incremental donation may be
multiplied if the charity responds to increased donations by in-
creasing solicitation in a range where the net returns to solicita-
tion are positive. The same result occurs if the charity responds by
decreasing solicitations in a range where the net returns are nega-
tive.29 Also, the impact of an incremental donation may be multi-
plied or diminished due to feedback effects on other donors.3"
Feedback effects cause an additional complication when there
are multiple donees. In deciding whether to make an incremental
donation to a given charity, a donor might consider the "cross-
donative" effects of the donations of others on related charities.
The donor gains little if a donation to a cancer research institute,
for example, induces other donors to shift allegiances to other in-
stitutes without increasing the overall level of cancer research sup-
port. Alternatively, if a contribution to the Democratic Party, for
example, not only increases donations by others but also reduces
donations to the Republican Party, the personal return to donating
would be magnified.
A donor has reason to feel defrauded if incremental donations
are diverted from incremental service provision. This occurs if a
fixed percentage of the net receipts of the campaign inure to the
benefit of any individual. For example, the manager of the charity
might covertly convert the entire net proceeds to his personal use.
It is for this reason that some statutes regulate fundraising indi-
rectly, by mandating a minimum expenditure on program rather
than a maximum expenditure on solicitation. When these statutes
include salaries as a program expenditure, abuse goes unchecked.
When these statutes exclude salaries, however, they are overly
broad, since fraud does not always accompany the payment of sal-
aries to a charity's personnel.
the response of other donors to solicitation is independent of the donation under discussion.
In light of a major, well-publicized donation, other donors may feel the need for their own
donations to be reduced, and thus be less responsive to solicitation efforts. Alternatively,
they may "join the bandwagon," increasing the donee's returns for each level of fundrais-
ing expenditure. The relevant "price" for large donations is derived in Steinberg. Donors,
supra note 22.
29. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 28.
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This situation is more complex when less than one hundred
percent of the net proceeds from solicitation inure to an individ-
ual. This situation arises if the manager of the charity receives a
profit-sharing type bonus or if the charity contracts with a profes-
sional fundraiser on a contingency or percentage basis. In these
cases, the donor may consider the diversion of funds to be a good
thing, because it induces a higher level of entrepreneurial effort
that can improve the quality and quantity of service provision.
However, if the incremental effect of a particular donation on en-
trepreneurial effort is negligible, the diversion of these incremental
donations may be objectionable to that donor. This holds true even
if society benefits from improved managerial effort induced by
sharing earlier donations with the manager of the charity.31
Regulation of fundraising is an indirect way of getting at this
problem because inurement is a separable issue. State nonprofit
incorporation laws generally restrict the nonprofit form to organi-
zations which disallow all private inurement.3 2 In addition, a char-
ity's federal corporate tax exemption may be denied due to this
sort of inurement.33 While the adequacy of the various state ap-
proaches remains unclear, they do seem to be more narrowly tai-
31. This is precisely the conclusion of a more formal model developed in Steinberg,
Optimal Contracts Need Not be Contingent: The Case of Nonprofit Firms, in MODELS OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 87 (D. Hyman & K. Parkum
eds. 1985) [hereinafter Steinberg, Optimal Contracts]. However, the model makes some
rather restrictive assumptions to derive this conclusion, so its generality remains in doubt.
32. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497,
501-02 (1981).
33. Exemption from the federal corporate income tax is provided only to those non-
profit organizations in which "no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986). This restriction has been
interpreted as prohibiting profit-sharing plans. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,865 (June 21,
1974). See also People of God Community v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 127 (1980)(payments
to persons having a personal or private interest in the organization preclude tax-exempt
status for the organization but payments to unrelated third parties do not); Gemological
Inst. of America v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1604, affd, 212 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1954)(per
curiam)(rejecting argument that payments td an individual were not part of net earnings
but merely measured thereby). Exemption was not denied, however, when a percentage-
based fee was paid to a hospital radiologist who did not control the organization. Rev. Rul.
69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113.
In 1980, the IRS seemingly reversed its policy of prohibiting "profit-sharing" plans
outright. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,283 (Feb. 15, 1980). Lashbrooke summarizes the new
developments and concludes: "The government is currently putting more emphasis on the
significant benefit accruing to the employer's exempt purpose from incentive compensation
than on the benefit derived by the employee. . . . It may only be a matter of time before
tax exempt organizations can create qualified profit sharing plans to attract and retain
quality employees." E. LASHBROOKE, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 165 (1985).
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lored to the state's legitimate interest. Accordingly, statutes of
this type should pass constitutional muster.
C. Summary
The average fundraising percentage contains little informa-
tion of value to individual donors for two reasons. First, the donor
may care about outcomes other than induced service expendi-
tures.34 Second, the average-share statistic contains no informa-
tion about the value of incremental donations. While society may
care about the average return to donations, individuals can only
control their increment to the donative pool. Thus, it is rational
that they should care only about incremental returns from their
individual donations. These incremental returns depend upon the
behavioral reactions of the soliciting firm, multiplier effects on
other donors, and cross-donative effects. Incremental returns do
not depend on the average fundraising percentage. Unfortunately,
it is not easy to measure incremental returns properly.
The average fundraising percentage is a simpler way for do-
nors to "assess" the value of their donations. This method, how-
ever, has little to commend itself besides simplicity. As discussed
above, donors might prefer charities with high fundraising per-
centages. Moreover, the development of incremental fundraising
percentage statistics requires continuous oversight. If high-fun-
draising percentage charities are more carefully scrutinized by le-
gal authorities and investigative reporters, the possibility of self-
dealing behavior is lower. 5
When a charity obligates itself, either behaviorally or con-
tractually, to divert a fixed percentage of net receipts, this per-
centage is relevant information for the donor. Thus, a law man-
dating disclosure of fixed-percentage contracts seems appropriate.
A court, however, might determine that such a law is overly broad
because there are alternative methods available that are less intru-
sive. Disclosure upon donor request statutes, for instance, yield the
same result.
34. Of course, the incremental fundraising percentage would be of little value to the
donor in this case since the donor's interest in the service output is limited.
35. Self-dealing is defined as "transactions wherein a trustee, acting for himself and
also as 'trustee,' a relation which demands strict fidelity to others, seeks to consumate a
deal wherein self-interest is opposed to duty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 707 (5th ed.
1983).
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II. THE DONEE PERSPECTIVE
Some states enact statutes that protect the interests of the
donee charitable organization. Most often, it is professional fun-
draising firms which pose the perceived threat. In Riley v. Na-
tional Federation of the Blind, the State of North Carolina
claimed that contracts between charities and professional fun-
draising firms must be regulated to protect the interests of the
charities themselves.3 6 The Supreme Court rejected this claim.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan argued:
there are several legitimate reasons why a charity might reject
the State's overarching measure of a fundraising drive's legiti-
macy - the percentage of gross receipts remitted to the charity.
For example, a charity might choose a particular type of fun-
draising drive, or a particular solicitor, expecting to receive a
large sum as measured by total dollars rather than the percent-
age of dollars remitted. Or a solicitation may be designed to sac-
rifice short-term gains in order to achieve long-term, collateral,
or non-cash benefits. To illustrate, a charity may choose to en-
gage in the advocacy or dissemination of information during a
solicitation, or may seek the introduction of the charity's officers
to the philanthropic community during a special event (e.g., an
awards dinner).a'
A high fundraising percentage can result from a contract with a
professional fundraiser or an entirely in-house operation. In either
case, explanations other than incompetence or fraud, including
sheer bad luck and the unpopularity of the cause, have been
recognized."8
36. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 108 S. Ct. 2667 (1988).
37. Id. at 2675.
38. The Supreme Court found in Schaumburg that there are:
organizations whose primary purpose is not to provide money or services for the
poor, the needy or other worthy objects of charity, but to gather and disseminate
information about and advocate positions on matters of public concern. . . . Or-
ganizations of this kind, although they might pay only reasonable salaries, would
necessarily spend more than 25 percent of their budgets on salaries and adminis-
trative expenses.
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 635 (1980).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, paraphrasing Schaumburg,
noted that: "The realm of religious and charitable organizations . . . includes groups
whose unorthodox messages will inevitably yield less cost-effective solicitation results. May
[the local authorities] premise the simultaneous admission of, for example, evangelical
Baptists and the exclusion of Krishna devotees on the results of their fund solicitation ef-
forts?" Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 631 (5th Cir. 1981).
Additional factors bearing on cost-effective solicitation have been discussed by the
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A charity can use statistical procedures to determine if it is
accomplishing its goals via fundraising.3 9 The essential data the
charity needs is the incremental return to the last dollar spent on
solicitation,4 ° which is unrelated to the average fundraising per-
centage. In the simplest case, when donors are sensitive to fun-
draising expenditures but not to the fundraising percentage, a ser-
vice-maximizing charity would select a budget leading to an
expected incremental return of a dollar. On the other hand, a
budget-maximizing charity would select a level leading to an in-
oremental return of zero.
The statistical analysis should include other factors in mea-
suring incremental returns. First, the charity should include the
expected effect of current solicitation on future net returns. Ap-
parently unproductive fundraising in the first few years of an or-
ganization's existence may allow the firm to weed out bad pros-
pects from its donor base. These future returns may be attributed
to start-up costs. Second, the charity should include the value of
in-kind and volunteer labor donations as well as monetary returns.
Finally, where the campaign produces both donations and an out-
put which the charity cares about (such as public education), the
value of such services should be added to the monetary returns in
estimating the incremental value of solicitation.
An informed and voluntary decision by a charity to compen-
sate its employees on a "profit-sharing" basis or to contract with a
professional fundraiser on a percentage basis is not necessarily a
wrong decision. Such contracts are rational when the gains to the
charity due to enhanced effort outweigh the losses due to donor
discouragement.1
When donors are sensitive to the fundraising percentage of
commentators. See Miller, Suggestions to Improve Private Standard Setting for Charities:
The NCIB Proposals, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, Nov. 1987, at 13; Quandt, The Regula-
tion of Charitable Fundraising and Spending Activities, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1158, 1178-79.
For empirical evidence, see Boyle & Jacobs, Fundraising Costs, PHILANTHROPY
MONTHLY, Apr. 1979, at 5.
39. See Steinberg, Optimal Fundraising by Nonprofit Firms, in 1985 SPRING RE-
SEARCH FORUM WORKING PAPERS, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING: NEW FRONTIERS OF
KNOWLEDGE 411 (1985). See also Boyle & Jacobs, The Economics of Charitable Fun-
draising PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY, May 1978, at 21; Cullis, Jones, & Thanassoulas, Are
Charities Efficient "Firms"? A Preliminary Test of the UK Charitable Sector, 44 PUB.
CHOICE 367 (1984); Weinberg, Marketing Mix Decision Rules for Nonprofit Organiza-
tions, 3 RES. MARKETING 191 (1980).
40. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
41. See Steinberg, Optimal Contracts, supra note 31, at 93.
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charities not using incentive contracts,42 the situation is more
complicated. Despite donor sensitivity, the charity's goals are not
generally accomplished by a zero fundraising percentage."3 Thus,
whether the charity's goal is budget or service maximization, the
charity has not necessarily erred in choosing a high fundraising-
percentage budget. This remains true even if an alternative budget
would lead to a lower fundraising percentage.
In summary, the fundraising percentage is not useful for de-
termining whether donees have been defrauded by professional
fundraisers or erred in their internal campaigns. Donees care
about incremental returns to solicitation (including lagged effects,
non-monetary donations, and joint production of service), which
are unrelated to average shares. This is so even when donors re-
spond negatively to high fundraising percentages.
III. THE SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE
In practice, the legitimate interests of donors may conflict
with those of donees. In such cases, society as a whole has an
interest in arbitrating the dispute. An example of this interest
arises when a donor is concerned with service provision and the
42. While this Article argues that such behavior by donors is irrational (see supra
notes 22-28 and accompanying text), the empirical evidence is mixed. One study concluded
that donations are sensitive to fundraising levels but not to fundraising percentage. Stein-
berg, Donors, supra note 22, at 357. In contrast, Weisbrod and Dominguez have found
that donors were significantly discouraged by a higher "price." The formula used to mea-
sure "price" was 1/(l-x), with x equal to the fundraising share in the previous year. Weis-
brod & Dominguez, Demand for Collective Goods in Private Nonprofit Markets: Can
Fundraising Expenditures Help Overcome Free-Rider Behavior, 30 J. PuB. EcON. 83, 94(1986). Finally, Harvey and McCrohan found a significant positive relation between per-
ceptions of efficiency and the size of donations. Harvey & McCrohan, Fundraising Costs
- Societal Implications for Philanthropies and Their Supporters, 27 Bus. & Soc'Y 15,
18 (1988).
43. The following example demonstrates this fact: Let C denote contributions, F so-
licitation expenses, and G the fundraising ratio F/C. Then, the service-maximizer's prob-
lem can be equivalently cast as picking G to maximize C - CG or C(I-G).
It is reasonable to assume that C is a single-peaked function of G. When G is zero,
contributions are low (F must be zero) but not zero (due to the reputation established
through fundraising in previous years). An increase in G would first increase C (due to the
direct effect of fundraising) then decrease it (due to donor dissatisfaction with high G).
The slope of the objective function is C'(1 - G) - C where C' denotes the slope of the
contributions function. If this is negative around G = 0, optimal fundraising would be zero
(since it is tedious but straightforward to show that the objective function is single-peaked).
Otherwise, the optimum involves strictly positive G. Thus, donees would not want a zero
fundraising ratio if C'(0) is larger than C(O).
The assumptions about the C function directly imply that budget-maximizers would
not want a zero fundraising percentage.
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donee is a budget maximizer. While individual donors are not de-
frauded by budget maximizers, because one hundred percent of
incremental donations are devoted to incremental service, donors
as a class are hurt since a reduction in the donee's solicitation
budget would increase the net proceeds available for service provi-
sion, making each member of the class better off. The question
then becomes whether the collective interests of the donor class
outweigh the interests of the recipient.
Economists generally analyze the social perspective in terms
of the pareto standard." A policy leads to a pareto improvement
if no individuals are worse off (in their own estimation) and at
least one is better off following the change. A related concept is
the potential pareto standard. A policy leads to a potential pareto
improvement when the gains to the winners (following adoption)
outweigh the losses of the losers, so that a suitable redistribution
would lead to an actual pareto improvement. An economy is said
to be (socially) inefficient if a feasible policy not yet in use would
lead to a potential pareto improvement.45
When the conflict between budget-maximizing donees and
service-maximizing donors described above arises, the allocation
may or may not be socially inefficient. Simplifying a bit, if the
donee values the opportunity to engage in budget-maximizing be-
havior more than donors value the increment to service provision
under alternative behavior, mutual gains are not possible.4 Econ-
omists might nonetheless justify regulation by labelling budget-
maximizing as a "merit bad" - a personal preference that society
should not respect. In other words, society places a lower value on
the activity than does the individual. However, economists have
never developed ethically defensible standards by which they can
determine whether a particular individual preference deserves the
disrespect of social planners. The decision here must therefore be
44. See generally H. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 42-45 (2d ed. 1988); J. STIGLITZ, EC-
ONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 53-60 (1986).
45. For a discussion of the pareto standard in the context of welfare economics, see
H. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 42-52 (2d ed. 1988); J. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 52-63 (1986).
46. See H. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 42 (2d ed. 1988); J. STIGLiTZ, ECONOMICS OF
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 53-54 & 59-60 (1986). Mutual gains might be possible if the donor
could transfer income to the budget maximizer directly. This would permit the nonprofit to
have a slightly larger budget while spending less on fundraising and providing more service
to the donors. Thus, inefficiency depends on whether the transaction costs of direct income
transfers of this sort exceed the increment to fundraising expenditures resulting from
budget-maximizing behavior.
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made on non-economic grounds.
The social perspective is broader than just donor/donee con-
flict, because fundraising affects other members of society. A com-
prehensive analysis of the social efficiency of fundraising is beyond
the scope of this Article. However, some examination of efficiency
analysis is useful.
To begin with, we must understand why donors respond to
solicitation efforts. If solicitation, as some allege about advertising,
alters the donor's pure preferences, efficiency analysis is ill-de-
fined. The donor may prefer his pre-solicitation allocation under
his pre-solicitation preferences and prefer his post-solicitation allo-
cation under his post-solicitation preferences. Thus, a neaningful
determination as to whether the donor is better off in his own esti-
mation cannot be made.
Ehrlich and Fisher's model of advertising provides an alterna-
tive which can be analyzed within the efficiency framework.4 Ac-
cording to this model:
advertising affects the demand for goods because it lowers the
gap between the market price received by the seller and the full
price borne by the buyer - a gap that exists because of the
buyer's cost of obtaining information about the characteristics of
varieties of products and sellers, and the costs of adjusting to
disappointing or imperfect purchases ....
[It is not necessary to construct] a positive theory of adver-
tising, to determine whether the knowledge conveyed by sellers'
messages is itself real or fancied, constructive or self-deluding by
any objective standard."8
The possibility of fraudulent fundraising raises serious ques-
tions, however, about the simple application of efficiency analysis.
This may be seen in an example suggested by Gordon Tullock: A
donee alleges that the plight of starving children would be allevi-
ated by contributions to his charity. However, the net proceeds
from the fundraising campaign are used to finance his vacation.
The uninformed donor will not discover the diversion of funds in
the normal course of events. Other charities, by assumption, are
not affected by this scam since the donor would not have contrib-
uted to them anyway.49
47. Ehrlich & Fisher, The Derived Demand for Advertising: A Theoretical and Em-
pirical Investigation, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 366, 367 (1982).
48. Id. at 366-67.
49. See Tullock, Information Without Profit, 1 PAPERS ON NON-MARKET DECISION
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This scam is pareto-improving - the donor feels good about
himself, the donee gets a nice vacation, and the starving millions
are no worse off. Tullock does not suggest that this scam is a good
thing; he infers, rather, that the pareto standard is ill-suited to
judging cases of misinformation. 0 The matter deserves a great
deal more thought.5'
External effects of fundraising provide a more conventional
source of inefficiency. An externality occurs when a market trans-
action affects agents who are not a party to that transaction. In
the fundraising market, such externalities arise in two ways. The
first example where externalities occur involves the situation
wherein donations are used to finance public goods (goods, like
national defense, that are consumable in a noncompetitive way).
When this occurs, each donor is potentially affected by the solici-
tation of others. This externality has not been specifically ad-
dressed in the literature. The second example where externalities
occur in the fundraising market arises where the productivity of
solicitation expenditures by one donee is affected by the solicita-
tion practices of other donees. This second effect has been ana-
lyzed, and is analogous to the well known tragedy of the
commons.
Extension of the tragedy of the commons model to fundrais-
ing is straightforward, and allows the following conclusions to be
drawn: When donees care only about their own net returns, fun-
draising by each charity is excessive; and if all charities reduced
their own solicitation expenditures, each would experience an in-
crease in net returns. Uncoordinated action by individual charities
cannot accomplish this result. When only one charity reduces its
solicitation expenditures, the benefit accrues only to other
MAKING 141, 142 (1966), reprinted in G. TULLOCK. THE ECONOMICS OF WEALTH AND
POVERTY 73, 74 (1986)(suggesting a similar example wherein the donee diverts the char-
ity's funds to increase the utility of the donations).
50. See id. at 145, reprinted in G. TULLOCK. THE ECONOMICS OF WEALTH AND POV-
ERTY 77 (1986).
51. A mechanism which increased the level of donor confidence in the result of their
donation could be socially efficient. It might, however, be inefficient for the government to
prosecute the wrongdoer after the scam has occurred. The donor would feel he had been
victimized and would be worse off. The donee would go to prison and be worse off. The
children would still starve. Prosecution would only be efficient if it deterred future miscon-
duct to such an extent that increases in donor confidence outweighed current losses. This
might make donors less confident about their donations -even though the objective risk is
lowered.
The most influential (but not the first or the most rigorous) exposition of this phenom-
enon is found in Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
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charities.52
In the short run, two mechanisms may ameliorate this exter-
nality. First, donees might care about other donees and plan their
campaigns accordingly. Second, donees might band together as a
united fundraising organization (such as United Way), internal-
izing the externality by conducting a joint campaign and restrict-
ing member fundraising expenditures. However, neither mecha-
nism solves the problem entirely. The first mechanism requires
and relies upon a difficult calculation and sufficient altruism to-
wards competing charitites by each donee. The second mechanism
is weakened by competition with nonmember charities. Member-
ship will never approach one hundred percent because mainstream
charities would fear the consequences of joining with controversial
causes in a united campaign.
Susan Rose-Ackerman pointed out an additional problem
that shows up in the long run. If new charities are formed to meet
unmet needs whenever positive net returns to fundraising are
available, the long run equilibrium appears to be massively ineffi-
cient.53 Her formal model demonstrates that "competition for
charitable dollars reduces the level of service provision relative to
funds raised for all charities. In the absence of entry barriers, the
number of charities increases until the fundraising share of the
marginal charity approaches one. This result holds even if donors
dislike high fundraising expenses."54
The real world situation is not as extreme as the formal
model. Rose-Ackerman details several barriers to entry which
keep us from attaining that long run equilibrium. Rose-Ackerman
concludes, however, that there is no reason to suppose that these
barriers are optimal.5 5 Her conclusion establishes a prima facie
case for government intervention.
52. Id.
53. These new charities implicitly neglect the detrimental effect of their actions on
the campaigns of established charities. See Rose-Ackerman, United Charities: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 28 PUB. PoL'Y 323 (1980); see also Steinberg, Nonprofit Organizations
and the Market, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 118, 125 (W. Powell ed. 1987). I say "ap-
pears" to be inefficient because fundraising is informative in the Rose-Ackerman model,
yet she did not calculate the value of added information in the overentry equilibrium to
determine whether it outweighed the loss in charitable services. Nonetheless, I suspect the
inefficiency conclusion would hold in a more complete analysis. See Rose-Ackerman, Char-
itable Giving and "Excessive" Fundraising, 97 Q.J. ECON. 195 (1982)[hereinafter Rose-
Ackerman, Charitable Giving].
54. Rose-Ackerman, Charitable Giving, supra note 53, at 205.
55. Id.
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IV. REGULATION AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCY
Social inefficiency may arise when donees are budget maxi-
mizers or when there is over-entry in the market. This section con-
siders three types of "remedies" - percentage limitations,
mandatory disclosure, and entry barriers - and concludes that
only entry barriers would have a positive effect on these social in-
efficiencies. Barriers to entry, however, may be more offensive to
free speech rights than the first two options.
A. Percentage Limitations
Donors view solicitation by budget-maximizing donees as ex-
cessive. If the donor loss exceeds the donee gain, this behavior is
socially inefficient as well. 6 A legal restriction on the absolute
level of permissible solicitation expenditures is the natural solution
to this problem. However, an effective program of this sort is not
feasible. If legislation does not carefully consider individual donee
circumstances, the law will inadvertently foster inefficiency in
some service-maximizing firms. However, an inordinate amount of
state resources would be necessary to assess the service-maximiz-
ing budget for each donee.
A variable ceiling on a donee's permissible fundraising per-
centage is less direct, but no less problematic. Although the fun-
draising percentage for some budget-maximizing charities might
be lower than the corresponding percentage for some service max-
imizers, only the budget maximizers should be so regulated since
the emphasis that service maximizers place on net returns makes
regulation unnecessary. Again, the allowable percentage must
vary with individual donee circumstances before any efficiency im-
provement occurs vis-a-vis budget maximizers. This would also re-
quire an inordinate amount of state resources.
A uniform ceiling on permissible fundraising percentage
would help to solve the long-run problem of overentry. The alloca-
tion would also be efficient in that those charities that donors most
want to support would survive, while charities serving less popular
causes would be unable to meet this legal requirement. The es-
sence of the free speech controversy, however, is that state regula-
tions should not impair the operation of organizations simply be-
cause they are unpopular.5 7 Such an impairment is the ultimate
56. See supra note 46.
57. See supra note 10.
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effect of a percentage limitation. The effect, however, is really a
matter of degree - absent State regulation, only those causes suf-
ficiently popular to obtain a positive net return can survive. State
regulation does not throw a new roadblock on survival, it merely
raises the height of an existing roadblock.
B. Mandatory Disclosure
The second remedy, a mandatory disclosure law, appears at
first to be unnecessary but harmless. A fraudulent answer to a
prospective donor's inquiry would be difficult to prosecute even
under a mandatory disclosure law, while a failure to answer would
completely foreclose contribution. Therefore, a mandatory disclos-
ure law would provide charities with an incentive that would in-
crease rather than decrease the amount of fraudulent information
in the marketplace. In addition, some donors may be too cynical
to ask for a disclosure, certain that charities with something to
hide would lie to them. These donors would not be any more likely
to believe a compelled statement. The credibility of such disclo-
sures might be enhanced if the government prosecuted misrepre-
sentation more vigorously. This is quite different, however, from
nonrepresentation.
Informational externalities complicate the analysis. If a news-
paper reporter, for example, was unable to obtain information
about a particular charity's fundraising practices, she would be
less likely to publish a story about that charity. If the charity were
forced to reveal unsavory practices, the reporter might publicize
them, causing a major decline in donations. The prospect of this
negative publicity would discourage the donee from engaging in
unsavory practices in the first place. A disclosure on request law
would obtain this advantage. A point-of-solicitation disclosure law
would provide no additional advantage.
Most point-of-solicitation disclosure proposals mandate brief
and objective disclosures such as past or anticipated fundraising
percentages. 8 This information is not useful to donors, since the
"price" of donations depends on complex factors which are diffi-
58. See, e.g., H.R. 2130, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H2132 (daily ed.
Apr. 22, 1987)(describing a bill introduced by Representative Owens requiring mandatory
disclosure). Cf. H.R. 2188, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H2638 (daily ed. Apr.
18, 1987)(describing a bill introduced by Representative Swift of Washington mandating a
minimum service expenditure percentage).
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cult to measure. 59 However, even if a sophisticated donor desires
point-of-solicitation disclosure for himself, he could still oppose
disclosure as a social policy if he feels that other donors are likely
to misinterpret the information and that the resulting loss in dona-
tions would outweigh the value of his own gain in information.
Also, if a donor generally trusted charitable organizations he
could oppose disclosure because the disclosed information would,
if unrebutted, deter contributions. Moreover, the charity might
successfully rebut disclosures that inhibit contributions, but only
at a high cost. Under these circumstances, disclosure reduces the
share of contributions devoted to service provision. Donors might
not believe the added security provided by a mandatory disclosure
law is worth this cost. A donee might also object to mandatory
disclosure if donees, faced with the prospect of a loss in donations,
would alter their behavior in a manner the donors regard as unfa-
vorable. In particular, a disclosure might induce the donee to sub-
stitute fixed payments for percentage compensation schemes. This
shift in contract form would reduce the fundraiser's incentive to
work, possibly causing a decrease in donations that could be made
available for service expenditures.6"
Another problem with disclosure laws is caused by inter-do-
nor externalities. Suppose, for example, that donors, persuaded by
the analysis of donor "price," regard budget maximizers as good
buys. In following their individual interests, however, they would
ignore society's collective interest in discouraging donees from
budget-maximizing behavior. It is possible (though by no means
assured) that mandatory disclosure laws, by allowing donors to
better perceive their individual interests, would lead donors to a
greater neglect of their collective interests. Thus, donors as a class
would be worse off.
C. Barriers to Entry
The third option for state legislators is to impose explicit bar-
riers to entry. One such barrier is a licensing law which would
allow only donees possessing a license to solicit donations. Re-
stricting the total number of licenses would eliminate overentry.
Determining the optimum number of licenses, however, would be
59. See supra note 42.
60. Conversation with Estelle James, Professor of Economics, State University of
New York at Stonybrook (November 4, 1988).
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quite difficult. As Susan Rose-Ackerman points out: "Although
entry barriers permit positive levels of charitable services, they
also reduce the ideological diversity of the nonprofit sector. The
tradeoff between the variety and volume of services is a central
policy dilemma."81
Another way to restrict entry is to issue and somehow allo-
cate a limited number of marketable permits.6 2 Solicitation with-
out a permit would be illegal, but permits could be bought and
sold on an open market. This system has the added advantage that
those charities which donors most want to support would ulti-
mately obtain permits, because the charity's willingness to pay for
a permit would be governed by the potential net returns to fund-
raising. This allocation would occur automatically and flexibly,
without any need for the state to know the potential fundraising
productivity of individual charities. But this method has one
unique disadvantage. Because the number of permits is limited,
the state has created an asset whose value fluctuates according to
market psychology. An organization, believing the price of permits
would rise in the short run, might engage in arbitrage by purchas-
ing more permits than it plans to use, hoping to sell them later at
a gain. Such self-feeding speculation adds uncertainty to the mar-
ket. Thus, the overall restrictiveness of a fixed quantity of permits
would vary unpredictably.
A final barrier-type solution would be to mandate that all
charitable solicitation take place through a united fundraising or-
ganization such as United Way. Rose-Ackerman analyzed this op-
tion, and concluded:
The fund economizes on fundraising costs both by reducing
competition between existing charities and by making entry
more difficult.
The benefits. . . are not costless, however. A federated
drive may make it difficult for ideologically disparate charities
to survive and may induce donors to purchase a package of
charitable services that does not suit their ideologies. 3
Each of these explicit entry barriers deals with the problem
61. Rose-Ackerman, Charitable Giving, supra note 53.
62. The idea of a marketable permit as a solution to pollution problems was first
proposed in J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968). 1 believe that I was the
first to suggest its application to fundraising in my unpublished paper, "The Private and
Social Efficiency of Fundraising by Nonprofit Organizations" (1982).
63. Rose-Ackerman, Charitable Giving, supra note 53, at 206.
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of overentry more directly than restrictions on fundraising per-
centages. Yet, if percentage restrictions impermissibly intrude
upon free speech rights, explicit entry barriers would seem to be
even less permissible. These barriers are, however, explicitly fo-
cused upon legitimate state interests, so perhaps some future
court, weighing the unavoidable conflict between individual and
societal rights, will accept entry limitations.
CONCLUSION
Fraud may indeed be a problem, but neither regulation of
fundraising percentage nor point-of-solicitation disclosure does
much to stem fraud. Indeed, these regulations would stem fraud
only by sheerest coincidence. Direct enforcement of anti-fraud and
inurement statutes may be difficult, but it would be no coincidence
if they succeeded.
The best reasons to regulate fundraising involve social ineffi-
ciencies. These stem from conflicts between donor and donee goals
and from externalities among donors and donees. Simply put, a
new charity lowers the potential net returns of fundraising for ex-
isting charities. There is a danger that new charities will enter
until the net returns are driven to zero. Yet, any attempt to re-
strict entry of new charities, either implicitly (through maximum
allowable fundraising share) or explicitly (through entry barriers)
conflicts with the free speech rights of less popular causes. The
tradeoff appears to be inherent, and the best compromise remains
to be found.
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